Stimulate Me! Energize Me! (Don’t Worry, It’s Just the Campaign Talking.)
August 13th, 2008 . by economistmomTwo nice points made in the Opinions section of today’s Washington Post–an editorial on the talk of a “second stimulus”, and a column by Robert Samuelson on the candidates’ ever-changing energy proposals.
The editorial worries about a “second stimulus” being too politically appealing for the economic costs of such a bill to get in the way:
We understand the political logic of a second stimulus; the economic case is less convincing. Any fiscal stimulus must be targeted, timely and temporary. That is, it must put money in the hands of people who are likely to spend it quickly — while not committing the federal government to new long-term spending. Some Democratic proposals, such as an increase in food stamps or extended unemployment insurance, would meet these criteria, even as they help the neediest ride out the tough times. Infrastructure spending, by contrast, is dubious as stimulus. It takes too long and passes through too many hands. As you might expect, Mr. Byrd’s “stimulus” bill is chock-full of election-year goodies…
…The government can pump only so much borrowed money into the economy before the long-term costs — inflation, higher interest rates — start to outweigh the short-term benefits. And with next year’s federal deficit projected to reach nearly $500 billion, those potential costs loom large, indeed. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, who supported the fiscal stimulus this year, seems cool to an extra dose now. As Mr. Bernanke notes, we still don’t know the results of the first stimulus.
(And as I’ve recently remarked, it’s not only too soon to label the first round a “flop” regarding its effect on consumption, it’s not at all clear that if the first round encouraged more saving than hoped, that that’s a bad thing…)
And Robert Samuelson worries that the recent Obama proposal to open up the strategic petroleum reserve, and the ol’ McCain proposal for the gas tax holiday, are bad signs–indicating that the campaign rhetoric can get in the way of seeing the real overlap in some real (good) energy policy ideas the two candidates have. He frets over:
…the messy process by which democracies reach consensus. “Crises are the only times when we are capable of making difficult decisions,” says former Democratic representative Phil Sharp, who heads the think tank Resources for the Future. High pump prices, he says, “are drawing both parties toward the center”: Republicans will be more open to regulation, Democrats to offshore drilling. The next president will find it easier to act. Maybe. But the preamble has involved so many exaggerations and simplicities that it’s uncertain whether the ultimate response would make us better off — or worse off.
I want to be optimistic and say we don’t need to get too worked up over these antics. It’s just the campaign talking. I’m hopeful that policymakers won’t confuse the need for short-term, demand-side (and perhaps deficit-financed) stimulus, with the (legitimate) need for more adequate, longer-term investments in our infrastructure–which ought to go along with the corresponding longer-term increases in national saving needed to finance those investments. And I’m hopeful that Senators McCain and Obama actually do have a lot of overlap in their ideas for energy policy, and that we’ll see more of those good (but not easy) ideas once one of them is in the White House.


“it’s not at all clear that if the first round encouraged more saving than hoped, that that’s a bad thing”
Hmmm. I always heard that GDP was C + I + G.
If the G gives me $100, and I invest $80,* is that really an increase in savings?
And if you’re going to claim it is, can you then explain endorsing all those hypocritical Congresscritters who are arguing for “balancing the budget”?
*Or, more realistically by the definition being used, pay down $40 of debt and “save” the other $40.
Ken: what I meant was that if the first round did not stimulate consumption as much as hoped (generated more personal saving than expected), that’s not necessarily a bad thing. The deficit-financed tax rebates represent a decrease in the public-sector component of national saving. Its “goal” as fiscal stimulus was to increase personal consumption (the C), i.e., to immediately increase C+I+G (+ net exports, =GDP). That “goal” is a short-term one that doesn’t require factoring in what’s going on with saving (income minus the C). But for the longer-term (or even medium-term), we want to pay attention to national saving, because that leads to higher GDP in the future (not immediately). In that regard, a “disappointing” consumption response now (because more of the rebate was saved than was expected to be saved) may translate into larger consumption possibilities later. It might not be that much later (so it’s premature to say the stimulus “flopped” as true stimulus), or it might be quite a bit later–meaning the rebate really did have a positive effect on personal saving–in which case national saving would not have declined as much as would have been the case if the rebate had “lived up to expectations” in its effect on personal consumption.
Don’t get me wrong, deficit-financed tax cuts or deficit-financed government spending lead to decreases in national saving–not to increases. I was just saying that relative to expectations, for a policy intended to stimulate short-term consumption (decrease saving), if it didn’t decrease saving/increase consumption as much as “hoped”, then that’s not a bad thing in my book–not for the longer-run economy at least.