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I have no idea, but the Congressional Budget Office took a crack at that question today, releasing a letter to my former boss, House Budget Committee Chairman John Spratt.  CBO concludes that while there’s a small probability that the direct cost to the government could turn out to be around $100 billion, the “expected federal budgetary cost” is just $25 billion (over fiscal years 2009-10)–because there’s a better than 50-50 chance that the proposed new Treasury authority (what can be thought of as an available ”line of credit”) would not be exercised.  (Here’s a nice report by Jeanne Sahadi at CNN-Money.)

Whatever the officially estimated budgetary cost or the actual effect on the level of the federal debt turns out to be, however, these figures grossly understate the financial commitment implicit in this effectively unlimited “line of credit”–that is, grossly understates the value to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in being able to say to the market, “don’t worry, we’re good for it.”  As CBO Director Peter Orszag explains on his blog (emphasis added):

CBO’s estimate reflects the current budgetary treatment and existing scorekeeping conventions for federal credit assistance and equity purchases and does not necessarily measure the underlying change in the federal government’s financial condition as a result of this legislation. On the one hand, the acquisition of financial assets like equities is recorded as an outlay in the budget even though such purchases may not change the government’s underlying financial condition. On the other hand, even if enacting this legislation would not result in outlays over the near term, it might effectively strengthen the linkages between the GSEs and the federal government and thereby increase the government’s underlying exposure to the risks associated with the GSEs’ activities.

In other words, the unlimited line of credit is worth a lot even if it’s never tapped into.  And I say it’s effectively an unlimited line of credit, because just like anything else in the federal budget that we’re willing to deficit finance (borrow to pay for), the line of credit defined by the “statutory debt limit” (currently set at $9.815 trillion, which we’re about $360 billion away from today) can be increased at any time by act of Congress, at the request of the Treasury Department.  Congress routinely (albeit reluctantly) votes to increase this limit whenever the existing limit is about to be breached.  So this Politico story (by David Rogers, no relation) about the “bonus” of an increase in the debt limit that might be hastened by the passage of a Fannie-Freddie rescue bill, is a bit misleading, in saying:

From Paulson’s standpoint, [Congress raising the debt limit] would solve another problem of appeasing Congress’s concerns about his rescue plan. To be effective, the secretary has argued that no cap should be put on his new authority, nor should it be subject to the debt ceiling [i.e., count as debt subject to the debt limit]. 

But Paulson appears willing to accept that condition now, since he would be assured that the ceiling will be raised to a level giving him enough room to assist Fannie and Freddie if needed.

Secretary Paulson and David Rogers make it sound as if the statutory debt limit is a binding constraint or a real limit, when it’s not.  It’s a sort of self-discipline device–an acknowledgment and reminder of the debt problem which gives understandable heartburn to the members of Congress when they have to vote on it.  But regardless of whether this legislation adds to the “debt subject to limit” or the debt not subject to limit, any eventual outlays will add to the real public debt.  And regardless of the budgetary impact of this legislation, we know the debt limit will be increased later this year (whether before the election or during a “lame duck” session), because it will have to be, with or without this legislation.

I’m fascinated by the ideological chart that Brad DeLong features in this post.  Brad’s point is that Barack Obama is not very liberal relative to other Democrats, and insignificantly more liberal than Hillary Clinton.  But what fascinates me, besides the relatively huge difference between Bush and McCain in how conservative they are, is how far apart the Democrats and Republicans are–that is, the tiny, tiny fraction of Democrats and Republicans who overlap on the ideological spectrum, in the center.

No wonder why we’re having such a hard time with “bipartisanship” and working together with our common concerns and priorities to come up with consensus policy solutions.  There’s not much there in common after all.

I always thought politicians had the incentive to move toward the center when it comes to winning elections, but maybe that model doesn’t work in practice.  I suppose the most vocal participants in the political process tend to come from the extremes and try to lure the politicians and policymakers toward those extremes, not toward the center.  And if you’re someone who tries to stay in the center, well, maybe you’re not exactly in the “middle” of lots of friends.

This polarization of opinions seems especially apparent in the blogosphere.  I noticed that in today’s Washington Post article about Netroots Nation, the liberal bloggers convention which took place this past weekend, Obama is made to sound ”not liberal enough.”

Of course, we at the Concord Coalition are used to being lonely and unpopular in staying in the center of fiscal policy, pointing out that getting the fiscal outlook in order will require everything to be on the table–both revenue increases and spending restraint.  We get conservative, supply-siders who accuse us of wanting to close the fiscal gap entirely through raising taxes and who say we don’t care about crippling the economy for the sake of deficit reduction.  And we get liberal champions of Social Security accusing us of laying all the blame on entitlement spending and wanting to destroy the programs.   Honestly, we are at neither extreme because neither extreme would produce a realistic, thoughtful strategy to reduce the budget deficit.  Only a centrist approach can get us there.  

It seems to me that until we get more of our politicians willing to come to the middle, there’s not going to be any common ground from which to work.  And until ordinary people (the voters) encourage politicians to come toward the middle, the politicians will be more inclined to listen to those loudest voices who are trying to pull them toward the extremes.

At Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad’s request, CBO just issued an analysis of the long-term budget outlook under deficit-financed tax cuts–answering the following:  What happens to budget deficits and the economy over the longer run (or even over the not-so-long run) if we go along with repeated violations/waivers of PAYGO as has been insisted on by the Bush Administration and many members of Congress (most recently, the Senate Republicans in the report I cited yesterday)?

Check out Table 1 on page 3 of the report.  Under current law (with expiring tax cuts OR with extended tax cuts that comply with PAYGO), the deficit as a share of the economy (GDP) would actually fall from 1.2% in 2007 to 1.0% in 2030, but would then start to grow (even with expired tax cuts) to 4.6% by 2050, and to 18.1% by 2082.  (The dramatic rise of the deficit in later years, despite revenues as a share of GDP growing from 18.8% in 2007 to 25.5% by 2082, shows that the longer-term problem is much more from rising health care costs than from deficient revenue.)  But under the scenario where extension of the Bush tax cuts and AMT relief is entirely deficit financed, deficits/GDP rise to 6.1% in 2030 (more than 6 times the 1.0% when paid for), 15.0% in 2050 (more than 3 times the 4.6% when paid for), and 39.3% by 2082 (more than 2 times the 18.1% when paid for).   (Note the difference shrinks over time when health costs become the far largest challenge.)

What difference do these deficits make for the economy?  CBO Director Peter Orszag lifts a couple paragraphs from the analysis onto his blog:

…simulations using one model—a textbook growth model that incorporates the assumption that deficits affect capital investment in the future as they have in the past—indicate that the rising federal budget deficits created by deficit financing of the indexation of the AMT would reduce real GNP per person by 6 percent in 2050 and by about 37 percent in 2080. If both the AMT were indexed and EGTRRA’s and JGTRRA’s personal income tax provisions were extended, and those changes were financed by additional borrowing, the economic costs would be even larger. By CBO’s estimates, real GNP per person would decline by 13 percent in 2050. Beyond 2073, projected deficits under those tax policies would become so large and unsustainable that the model cannot calculate their effects.

Despite the substantial economic costs generated by deficits in that model, such estimates may significantly understate the potential loss to economic growth under deficit financing of the tax changes…

Just as with CBO’s earlier analysis at Congressman Ryan’s request (my commentary on that posted here), the analysis focuses on the macroeconomic effects of budget deficits, rather than the potential microeconomic effects of the particular tax or spending policies on household or firm behavior.  In this particular analysis of deficit-financed vs. paid-for tax cuts, Peter Orszag explains that the microeconomic, incentive effects are the same under both scenarios for the tax cut in question…

To assess the economic effects, CBO compared a scenario with the tax changes financed through deficits with an alternative scenario in which the tax changes were financed fully from the start via changes in other policies. Because the analysis assumes that the tax changes are enacted in either case, the difference between the two scenarios highlights the effects of using deficits to finance them.

…although it should be pointed out that the microeconomic, incentive effects of the mix of policies used to pay for the tax cuts in the paygo-compliant (extended baseline) case are not simulated, just as in the CBO analysis for Congressman Ryan, the potential micro-behavioral effects from the drop in health care spending were not simulated.

According to this new policy paper on the Senate Republican Policy Committee’s website, the reason (or rather the latest reason) the Senate Republicans have refused to pay for tax cuts a la the PAYGO rules is not “just because,” and not because they don’t believe in fiscal responsibility, but because PAYGO isn’t fair to tax cuts. 

Apparently they buy into the line of argument made on the Tax Policy Center’s TaxVox blog by Rudy Penner, and maybe didn’t read my post on this topic here on EconomistMom.com, nor BlueDog’s comment on TaxVox, nor Rudy’s follow-up post.

There’s so much to point out that’s wrong in this piece that I don’t know where to begin.  Most of it should be clear if you reread my earlier post.  But apart from the additional budget geeky things I could point out (like paying for things with cuts in discretionary spending does not “count” as PAYGO compliant–and for good reason), what I really want to scream about is their last couple paragraphs in the executive summary, where they first chastise Democratic lawmakers for not complying with PAYGO “again and again” (gee, why was that?…) and then scold those same lawmakers for complying with PAYGO with increased taxes (aha, there’s the real problem…).

And then the last paragraph in the summary refers to lawmakers using PAYGO as just a “mask of fiscal responsibility.”  Mask?  That would mean a facade–something used to hide one’s true character, as if those members of Congress who have been insisting on PAYGO (such as the Blue Dogs) are actually engaged in some grand deception, fooling the American public into liking them for their popular(?) positions on raising taxes and restraining spending, when all they really want to do is increase the deficit.  Wow.  Really?

I like to think of PAYGO as a “fig leaf” rather than a “mask.”  It seems that it’s the only shred of anything to cover our vulnerable fiscal parts, the only little thing that’s keeping the fiscal situation from getting even more obscene. 

News flash from the Senate, courtesy of Richard Rubin of CQ:

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell offered a new strategy Thursday for breaking a deadlock over a series of expired and expiring tax provisions, but Democrats didn’t appear to see it as any kind of breakthrough.

In a letter to Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., McConnell suggested that Congress could offset the cost of the extensions by reducing the increase for non-defense discretionary spending contained in the recently adopted budget (S Con Res 70).

That marks somewhat of a shift for Senate Republicans, who have blocked consideration of a House-passed tax bill (HR 6049), creating a stalemate that has frustrated businesses who are eager to see their favorite tax provisions continued.

Republicans had recently been insisting that extensions of expiring provisions should not be offset, because they contend that Congress should not have to pay for any policy that would keep current tax policies the same. House Democrats, particularly the conservative Blue Dog Coalition, have demanded offsets, to comply with the pay-as-you-go budget rule.

In his letter, McConnell, R-Ky., changed his conference’s approach slightly, arguing that offsets for extensions of existing tax policy were acceptable as long as they came from spending.

“If agreed to, extension of expiring tax relief, including extension of the AMT [alternative minimum tax] patch and expiring energy tax incentives, could be accomplished in a way that achieves your stated goal of being deficit neutral, but without the unstated and unwarranted result of increasing the size of the federal government,” he wrote.

I’m sure this offer isn’t going to go over very well.  And funny how a tax increase used to pay for a tax cut is considered an increase in the size of government, but the tax cut (the “tax expenditure”) in the first place is not.  As I’ve said many times here before, just because you finance a tax cut by increasing the deficit doesn’t mean it’s free and doesn’t mean it’s not shifting more of our economy’s resources into government- sponsored/subsidized activities.

On a related note, if complying with pay-go in enacting tax cuts is so hard to do (politically), should we just give up and make it a lot easier to pass fiscally irresponsible (deficit-financed) tax cuts?  That’s what the Tax Policy Center’s Rudy Penner seems to advocate, in his recent post on the TaxVox blog.  Rudy argues that the current practice of setting the CBO revenue baseline to reflect current tax law creates a bias that favors extending spending over extending tax cuts.  Rudy says:

…a renewal of a temporary entitlement at current levels, such as food stamps, is not considered to be a spending increase, but a renewal of temporary tax relief is considered to be a tax cut.  This has important consequences if the Congress is applying a pay-as-you-go rule (PAYGO) that requires that any tax “cut” or entitlement “increase” must be paid for with some other tax increase or entitlement cut.  Reauthorizing agricultural subsidies at current levels does not have to be paid for whereas extending temporary relief from the alternative minimum tax does require raising another tax or cutting an entitlement.

But Rudy fails to point out that “renewal” and “temporary” as applied to the entitlement program vs. the tax cut have different meanings.  The “renewal” of a “temporary” entitlement program is a “reauthorization” of an entitlement program already in law.  How is reauthorization of an existing program different from enactment of a new program, in terms of the budget process?  The permanent, multi-year costs of entitlement programs are scored and subject to budget rules at the time they are enacted.  At the time of reauthorization, the “renewal” does not represent new spending, at least not under CBO scoring conventions.  In contrast, when a tax bill is (intentionally) written to have tax cuts expire at a certain date before the end of a budget horizon, only the costs up to that expiration are scored.  So “renewal” of expiring tax cuts involves costs that have not previously been counted.  (”Temporary” regarding tax cuts is really more temporary, at least as officially measured, than “temporary” regarding entitlement programs.)

Rudy’s line of thinking leads him to this recommendation:

A more sensible approach would regard all temporary spending tax policies to be permanent.  In addition to leveling the playing field, it would make the baseline a more accurate predictor of future spending and revenues, because almost all temporary tax and spending provisions are, in fact, routinely extended.

Although I certainly agree with Rudy that for policy analysis purposes, it’s more realistic to consider permanent versions of tax cuts as revealing the true cost of expiring tax provisions (and by the way, that’s why any good budget analyst loves Table 1-5 in CBO’s annual Budget and Economic Outlook), I disagree that it would be “sensible” to set the official revenue baseline to assume that expiring tax cuts are permanently extended, if in fact those tax cuts were not scored at their initial passage under the assumption that they would be permanent.  Adopting a budget baseline that assumed permanent extension of expiring tax cuts would effectively exempt such temporary tax cuts from fiscal discipline, as the costs of extension would never have been scored and would not be subject to pay-go even at the time of renewal.  Adopting such a revenue baseline would sabotage the pay-go rules regarding tax cuts.

I have written on this before in an earlier post on the issue of “revenue neutrality”–to explain that the official revenue baseline, although admittedly not a realistic view of revenue policy, is still highly relevant in terms of the budget process and fiscal discipline:

The revenue baseline that matters for legislative purposes and complying with the pay-as-you-go (PAY-GO) rules is not the revenue path that is most likely to occur (and Howard [Gleckman, of TaxVox] is right that either extreme [of letting all of the tax cuts expire or none of the tax cuts expire] is highly unlikely)–but the revenue path that would be achieved under current law.   Current law says all of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts expire after December 31, 2010.  That means that for pay-go purposes, letting some of the tax cuts expire in order to “pay for” the tax cuts you want to extend (Obama’s general strategy) is not really paying for it at all.  Such a strategy would not technically be a revenue-neutral or deficit-neutral one, but a revenue-losing, deficit-increasing, pay-go violating, one (albeit, less of one than if you’re not willing to let any of the tax cuts expire, a la McCain). 

So obviously Rudy just wants to make life easier for the next President regarding the thorny issue of what to do about the Bush tax cuts.  Now, if Rudy instead wants to advocate a budget rule that disallows the legislative sunsetting of tax cuts that are obviously meant to be permanent (although I’m not sure how easy that would be to identify), or otherwise gets those permanent costs considered and scored at the time of initial legislative consideration (i.e., to be more analogous to the way entitlement spending is treated), I’m with him.

It’s not just New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine who’s finding it hard to balance the budget–at least he’s getting some things passed and is just paying the price with declining public approval ratings.  Virginia Governor Tim Kaine (my governor) is having trouble just getting things passed.

This morning’s Fairfax (Virginia) section of the Washington Post writes that Governor Kaine, in working with a Republican-controlled House and a Democratic-controlled Senate, has had a hard time getting the votes to pass any (transportation-related) tax increase that would help fund Virginia’s badly-needed transportation projects.  The story should sound familiar to anyone who’s followed the debates on the federal budget on the floors of the U.S. Congress:

Senate Democrats want an increase in the gas tax as well as minor increases in the sales tax and new regional taxes in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads, partially offset by a reduction in the sales tax on food. Kaine, backed by House Democrats, shied away from raising the gas tax and instead sought an increase in the sales tax on vehicle purchases.

The division has made it easier for Republicans in the House and Senate to oppose both proposals. Instead of being on the defensive, GOP legislators say they now have cover to come out against both plans, arguing to their constituents that even Democrats are opposed to raising some taxes and fees to build more roads.

…If the legislature leaves town without doing anything, Democrats remain optimistic that the electorate in vote-rich Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads will punish the GOP in 2009.

But as it stands, the session will be known as one in which House and Senate Democrats — not Republicans — have had to cast tough votes.

With all 19 Senate Republicans unified in opposition to a statewide tax increase — confident they have political cover because of the economic slowdown and the high price of gas — [VA Senate Majority Leader] Saslaw had to struggle to get the support of the Senate Democrats [for his proposal to raise gas taxes].

And that proposed gas tax increase was pretty small–according to the article:  “Saslaw’s plan [would] raise the gas tax by 6 cents over six years, which would cost the average family less than $50 a year.”  But when it seems the alternative might be to actually cut gasoline taxes (when you hear talk of gas tax holidays), any proposal to raise the tax seems relatively outlandish. 

It’s just not easy being fiscally responsible, particularly at a time when the political and economic climate encourages precisely the opposite.

I can’t let some of the federal-budget-related events of the past week, which I missed by being on vacation, go unnoticed here on EconomistMom.com.  So today I’m playing catch up.

First, you gotta hand it to those House Democrats, who keep proposing and passing fiscally-responsible (pay-go compliant) tax cuts.  Last week the Ways and Means Committee reported, and the full House passed, H.R. 6275, a revenue-neutral extension of Alternative Minimum Tax relief for the current (2008) tax year, with more than half of the $61.5 billion cost paid for with the highly controversial “carried interest” provision.  Such a strategy failed last year–multiple times, and ultimately–when the Senate refused to go along with the various revenue offsets in the various versions of AMT bills that came before them, and no one expects it to go any other way this year.  Even with the House Democrats taking a firm stand in insisting that the ”tax extenders” bill (H.R. 6049, which passed the House in May) must be deficit-neutral (see this letter to the Senate), they have not been nearly so strong in their talk about the AMT bill.  (Why the Senate won’t pay for those other extenders, I still don’t understand.)

And in more news portending rising budget deficits, the President yesterday signed a $186.5 billion supplemental spending bill (H.R. 2642), which includes $161.8 billion to fund war operations through next June.  This was the bill that also includes veterans’ educational benefits that the Blue Dog Democrats had hoped to pay for, but again lost out on.  (By the way, once it became clear that no one else would go along with paying for these new veterans’ benefits, the cost of the plan only grew–by more than $10 billion to almost $63 billion over ten years.)

And while I was goofing off on vacation, my boss, Bob Bixby, was really busy.  He testified before a Senate subcommittee, and got ready for a Milwaukee installment of the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour (yesterday).  I’ll highlight some of his testimony later this week in a post that will get just a bit more specific about Social Security (given some pretty intense discussions here in the past week in response to my “young people get it” post), while revisiting some of that basic budget math I talked about in the first few days of this blog.

This week the House Budget Committee held a hearing on the “Securing America’s Future Economy” (SAFE) Commission Act (H.R. 473), as a favor to Jim Cooper, the House sponsor of the bill and a Blue Dog member of the Budget Committee.  Here’s the Peter G. Peterson Foundation press release on the testimony of Peterson and David Walker.  From the Congressional Research Service summary of the legislation:

Securing America’s Future Economy Commission Act, or SAFE Commission Act - Establishes the Securing America’s Future Economy (SAFE) Commission to develop legislation designed to address: (1) the unsustainable imbalance between long-term federal spending commitments and projected revenues; (2) increases in net national savings to provide for domestic investment and economic growth; (3) the implications of foreign ownership of federally issued debt instruments; and (4) revision of the budget process to place greater emphasis on long-term fiscal issues.

Requires the Commission to: (1) develop one or two methods for estimating the cost of legislation as an alternative to the current Congressional Budget Office (CBO) method; and (2) hold at least one town-hall style public hearing within each federal reserve district.

Requires the Commission to submit a legislative proposal to Congress and the President. Authorizes the President to submit to Congress an alternative proposal. Authorizes the Committee on the Budget of either chamber to publish its own alternative proposal in the Congressional Record.

Sets forth procedures for consideration of such legislation.

Requires CBO to prepare a long-term cost estimate and have it published in the Congressional Record as expeditiously as possible whenever requested to do so by the Commission, the President, or the chairman or ranking minority member of the Committee on the Budget of either chamber.

Now, to this economist, that sounds completely reasonable, but I know there are many members of Congress who oppose the formation of such a commission.  There are 95 House cosponsors, including many Blue Dog Democrats, but also some Democrats who aren’t Blue Dogs–probabaly considered more liberal than the Blue Dogs–but also some very conservative Republicans.  It is indeed a rather strange group of bedfellows.  I used to think those who opposed the SAFE commission were doing so on process grounds, but I’m starting to wonder if I’ve been too naive– that maybe the motive for some of that opposition, and maybe for some of the promotion as well, is on ideological grounds.

That feeling was clued into me through the responses here to my “Young People Get It” thread, and through a thread started by Pete Davis on Capital Gains and Games and then continued in threads started by Pete’s co-bloggers, Andrew and Stan (thanks, guys).  I now get the sense (duh?) that many of those who oppose the SAFE commission believe that the commission is intended to destroy Social Security as we know it.

I’m starting to understand the sensitivity of folks to the fiscal hawks’ lumping together of Social Security with the health entitlement programs when we talk about the unsustainability of the overall federal entitlement system.  And we fiscal hawks do certainly already understand that the overall challenge comes mostly (but not entirely) on the health costs side.  I think it’s that some of us are concerned that it’s the overall challenge that really threatens the health of all of the entitlement programs, because it’s the overall challenge that severely threatens the future economic growth that is needed to keep the programs that now don’t look so badly off (i.e., Social Security) on strong footing.

So it’s obvious that this is a conversation we need to get into more.  Thanks to all who have commented here and elsewhere in the blogosphere for making this a priority for me and for Concord. 

Now, back to my vacation!

Last week in DC, a group of young (20-something and 30-something) leaders from all over the country met with fiscal policy experts at the “Youth Entitlement Summit” (YES!) to learn more about our nation’s long-term fiscal challenges, and to coalesce around a strategy they can take, as young leaders, to help turn the situation around. 

Here is the declaration the young leaders read on national (C-SPAN) TV at the dinner hosted by the Concord Coalition, which was the culmination of the YES two-day summit.  If you watch the video, you’ll see that the young people do “get it”–and that the “old people” (no offense, Belle, Stuart, and Bob, as I count myself as one, too) are impressed:

In our democracy, there exist fundamental obligations that bind us together. This intergenerational compact compels us to leave future generations in better condition than we ourselves are in.

Our generation believes that the promise of the American dream must be continually renewed. Yet our ability to address new challenges is severely impaired. The social contract is crumbling and is taking down the rest of government finances with it.

Therefore we make the following findings and assertions:

Whereas short-term thinking has dominated our politics, the democratic process for redress of these grievances has failed . . .

Whereas honest debate has been undermined by political expediency and special interests . . .

Whereas young people are underrepresented in government despite historic levels of civic engagement and future generations cannot speak for themselves . . .

Whereas health care’s runaway cost increases require comprehensive reform to Medicare, Medicaid, and indeed our entire health care system…

Whereas America’s demographic changes, namely an aging of the population and lengthening life spans, requires significant revisions to Social Security…

Whereas Social Security’s mechanism for creating equity across generations, the trust fund, has proved inadequate. . .

Whereas Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are all on unsustainable paths. . .

Whereas a failure to correct the paths of said programs will lead to their failure, total budget insolvency, inequity for current and future generations unprecedented in the history of the United States, and inability to address other priorities, and declining economic prosperity…

Therefore, we hereby declare our generational interdependence.  We will work to achieve reforms that are fair for all generations, including those to come.

Pursuant to our study of these issues, we resolve:

1) Fair and effective action MUST be taken up by the next President and next Congress. Delay compounds both the inequity and the difficulty of reform.

2) Changes to the tax and benefit formulas of Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare must be considered together to meaningfully fix the system.

3) For those who can work, a delayed and flexible retirement age will improve generational equity, match the original promises of the program, and strengthen our nation’s economy.

4) Meaningful savings mechanism, in concert with investment in financial education and fiscal literacy for those disproportionately impacted, would help ensure retirement adequacy and fairness and offer young Americans more control and ownership of their future.

5) To address Medicaid and Medicare requires nothing short of a comprehensive overhaul of the larger healthcare system. 

6) Our current budget system – complex, burdensome, and riddled with concessions to special interests – is an impediment to entitlement reform; tax and spending reforms should be part of the solution.

The preceding is the result of our coming together for an intensive, two day summit investing the challenges facing our generation.  We come from various ideological perspectives, but share the common goal of strengthening this country and our future.  No politician who claims to represent young people can in good conscience ignore these issues.  We call on our leaders to act- and act now.

What a huge loss for the DC media-politics community.  He was one of those you’d love to watch because his enthusiasm was so contagious, you’d feel it leap out from the TV screen, and he’d make anyone who works in the crazy world of DC politics feel pumped about what they were doing. 

The passage that caught my attention from today’s Washington Post story by Howard Kurtz:

“He was a junkie,” said Washington Post writer Sally Quinn, a close friend. “He would say, ‘People find stories about the budget boring — that’s crazy.’ And then he would talk about the behind-the-scenes fights, the cast of characters, and it was interesting.”